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Abstract
Let X and Y be compact sets, and T : X → X, S : Y → Y be continuous
maps. Let
ϕi(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
Ai(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) for i = 1, 2,
where µ is T -invariant and ν is S-invariant, be payoff functions for a game
(in the usual sense of game theory) between players that have the set of
invariant measures for T (player 1) and S (player 2) as possible strategies.
Our goal here is to establish the notion of Nash equilibrium for the game
defined by these payoffs and strategies. The main tools come from ergodic
optimization (as we are optimizing over the set of invariant measures) and
thermodynamic formalism (when we add to the integrals above the entropy
of measures in order to define a second case to be explored). Both cases are
ergodic versions of non-cooperative games. We show the existence of Nash
equilibrium points with two independent arguments. One of the arguments
deals with the case with entropy, and uses only tools of thermodynamical
formalism, while the other, that works in the case without entropy but can
be adapted to deal with both cases, uses the Kakutani fixed point. We also
present examples and briefly discuss uniqueness (or lack of uniqueness). In
the end, we present a different example where players are allowed to col-
laborate. This final example shows connections between cooperative games
and ergodic transport.
The author is partially supported by FAPERGS (proc.002063-2551/13-0).
1 Introduction
A strategic non-cooperative game (in the usual sense of game theory - see [9]) is
defined by a set of players, and for each player: (i) a set of strategies and (ii) a
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payoff (or profit) function that depends on the strategies chosen by each one of the
players. Here, we consider ergodic versions of such games. Suppose there are two
continuous maps T : X → X and S : Y → Y defined on compact metric spaces X
and Y . Suppose we have two players, and the strategies of player 1 are given by
the set of invariant measures for T , while the strategies of player 2 are the invariant
measures for S. If Ai : X × Y → R , i = 1, 2, are two Lipschitz potentials, we
define, in a first model, the payoff function for player i as the function
ϕi(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
Ai(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) for i = 1, 2,
where µ is T -invariant and ν is S-invariant. In a second model, we define as payoffs{
ϕ1(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A1(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(µ),
ϕ2(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A2(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(ν),
where h(µ) and h(ν) are the metric entropies of µ and ν. The first case, which is
the ergodic optimization setting, will define what we call an ergodic game, while
the second case, which is related to the thermodynamical formalism, will define
what can be called an ergodic game (as in the first case) or a thermodynamic
game.
We consider two players, but the general case of N players is an easy general-
ization. The ergodic concepts are used to define the space of strategies for each
player. In both cases, we consider the product of measures when integrating po-
tentials Ai, which reflects the lack of collaboration between players: we suppose,
as usual in the non-cooperative game theory, that players do not communicate
with each other. We present a concept of equilibrium (or solution) for the game
based on the Nash equilibrium used in non-cooperative game theory, where players
are in equilibrium if any one of them who change his strategy gets a worst result
provided the other players keep their strategies unchanged (which shows that a
Nash equilibrium point is stable, in some sense).
We present two independent proofs of existence of Nash equilibrium. The first
one is more general and just requires the potentials to be Lipschitz continuous,
can be applied to both cases (with or without entropy), and uses a set-valued fixed
point due to Kakutani, which is not very usual in the ergodic theory literature. The
second proof uses more conventional arguments of thermodynamical formalism but
can only be applied to the second case (payoffs with entropy - or thermodynamic
games).
Both proofs are independent and perhaps the reader more familiar to ergodic
optimization will be more comfortable with the second proof, while the first one
is more general but uses the Kakutani theorem, which was used in game theory to
provide existence of equilibrium of classical (non-ergodic) games, but, as already
2
said, is not very usual in the areas of ergodic optimization and thermodynamic
formalism.
The Wasserstein-1 metric plays an important role in the proofs of existence.
We present some examples in the text and also discuss why uniqueness of
solutions is not a trivial question. We finish with a different model (the hierarchical
case), that is a special case without entropy, that allow us to use some concepts of
cooperative games leading to the use of ergodic transport techniques (see [5, 6]).
We stress, however, the fact that this example is unique in the text: all other
situations considered here, including the definition of Nash equilibrium and proofs
of existence, are in the domain of non-cooperative ergodic game theory, where
players are supposed not to communicate or collaborate with each other.
This paper is structured as follows: in the second section of the paper, we
establish the notion of ergodic games in the two cases we consider here, and present
some examples. In the third section, we prove existence of Nash equilibrium for
the first case (ergodic games, without entropy), while in the fourth section, we
prove existence for the second case (thermodynamic games). In the fifth section,
we discuss uniqueness. In the last section, we present a final example that uses
ideas of ergodic transport.
2 Ergodic theory and games
Before setting up the ergodic games, we recall that a strategic non-cooperative
game in normal form (see [9]) between a finite number of players is given by a set
{1, 2, ..., N} (set of players), and for each player i:
(a) a set Si , called the set of strategies for player i;
(b) a function ϕi : S1 × ... × SN → R, called the payoff or utility function of
player i.
Given such a game, each player wants to maximize its own payoff. We suppose
that payoff functions depend on the choices of strategies of all players, which
explains the interaction scheme we have here. We also suppose players do not
communicate / collaborate with each other. Therefore, when we search for the
best strategy for each player, the situation is totally different from the case where
one just has to optimize a certain function. There are different concepts of solution
or equilibrium points for games (dominated strategies, Pareto optimality, etc). We
will use here one of the most important concepts of equilibrium for non-cooperative
games, due to Nash (see [8]), which will be carefully introduced after we set up
the ergodic (and thermodynamic) games.
Let (X, dX) and (Y, dY ) be two compact metric sets, and T : X → X and
S : Y → Y be two continuous maps. Let M(X) andM(Y ) represent respectively
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the probability measures on the Borel sets of X and Y , whileMT (X) andMS(Y )
represent, respectively, the invariant probability measures for T and S.
The following lemma is a well-known result (see [3]):
Lemma 1. The sets MT (X) and MS(Y ) are, respectively, non-empty compact
and convex subsets of M(X) and M(Y ).
Here, as usual, we are using the weak-* topology. Therefore, µn ∈ M(X)
converges to µ ∈M(X) if and only if
∫
ψdµn →
∫
ψdµ for any continuous function
ψ : X → R, and we have the analogous definition for sequences of measures in
M(Y ).
We define an ergodic game between two players 1 and 2 by considering payoffs{
ϕ1 :MT (X)×MS(Y )→ R,
ϕ2 :MT (X)×MS(Y )→ R,
where MT (X) can be seen as the set of strategies for player 1, while MS(Y ) is
the set of strategies for player 2.
In this paper, we will consider that the payoff functions are given by
ϕi(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
Ai(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) , i = 1, 2, (1)
or {
ϕ1(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A1(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(µ),
ϕ2(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A2(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(ν),
(2)
where in both cases Ai : X × Y → R, for each i = 1, 2 are Lipschitz continuous
potentials, and in the second case h(µ) and h(ν) are the metric entropies of µ and
ν. In the product space X × Y , we use the metric given by d((x, y)), (x′, y′)) =
dX(x, x
′) + dY (y, y
′). We call both games ergodic games, and the second can also
be called a thermodynamic game.
It is important to remark that the only measures we consider here are the
product of invariant measures. This structure that only allows product measures
is necessary because of the lack of cooperation between players. In the last section,
we will present an entirely different game where players can cooperate, and there
we will use measures in X × Y that are no longer product measures.
In order to introduce Nash equilibrium in ergodic games, we begin by studying
the best response of player 1 given that player 2 is using a strategy ν ∈ MS(Y ).
Here, in the case payoffs are given by (1), the search for a best response set will
involve a usual ergodic optimization problem, while in the case that payoffs are
given by (2), we will search for equilibrium measures. However, a solution for the
game involves the solution of two simultaneous ergodic optimization problems (or
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the search for two equilibrium measures), in a sense that soon will be clear. Note
that, in the case payoffs are given by (1), i.e., in the case
ϕi(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
Ai(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) =
=
∫
X
(∫
Y
Ai(x, y)dν(y)
)
dµ(x) , i = 1, 2,
we see that, for ν fixed, the map µ→ ϕ1(µ, ν) is a linear functional and, therefore,
there exist at least one measure µ that maximizes
µ 7→ ϕ1(µ, ν). (3)
So, for any ν ∈ MS(Y ), we define BR1(ν) as the set of maximum points for (3),
i.e.,
BR1(ν) = {µ ∈MT (X) ‖ ϕ1(µ, ν) ≥ ϕ1(η, ν) ∀η ∈MT (X)} ,
which is a compact and convex subset of MT (X). BR stands for best response, a
terminology used in game theory, and BR1(ν) can be seen as the set of optimal
strategies for player 1 supposing player 2 is using the strategy ν. Analogously, we
define BR2(µ) using the second potential A2: if µ ∈MT (X),
BR2(µ) = {ν ∈ MS(Y ) ‖ ϕ2(µ, ν) ≥ ϕ2(µ, η, ) ∀η ∈MS(Y )} ,
which is a compact and convex subset of MS(Y ).
We remark the fact that BR1(ν) is a subset of MT (X), while BR2(µ) is a
subset ofMS(Y ). In fact, if M is a set and P(M) denotes the set of subsets of M
(sometimes denoted in the literature by 2M), we can write{
BR1 :MS(Y )→ P(MT (X)),
BR2 :MT (X)→ P(MS(Y )).
We summarize these results in
Lemma 2. In the case payoffs are given by (1),
a) For any ν in MS(Y ), BR1(ν) is a convex and non-empty compact subset of
MT (X).
b) For any µ in MT (X), BR2(µ) is a convex and non-empty compact subset of
MS(Y ).
5
In the case payoffs are given by (2), the best-response sets can analogously
be defined, and a version of the lemma above also holds under some additional
hypothesis, see lemma 6 in section 4.
Now we are ready to define Nash Equilibrium. The following definition works in
both cases of potentials we are considering here. We remark that Nash Equilibrium
was introduced in the fifties in the context of the usual games by Nash, see for
example [8].
Definition 1. We say that a pair (µ¯, ν¯) ∈MT (X)×MS(Y ) is a Nash equilibria
for the game described above if µ¯ ∈ BR1(ν¯) and ν¯ ∈ BR2(µ¯).
If (µ¯, ν¯) ∈MT (X)×MS(Y ) is a Nash equilibrium point, we have that:
(a) player 1 can not get a better result by playing a different strategy µ˜ 6= µ¯ if
player 2 uses strategy ν¯, and
(b) player 2 can not get a better result by playing a different stratey ν˜ 6= ν¯ if
player 1 uses strategy µ¯.
So unilateral changes of strategy are not welcome, which makes (µ¯, ν¯) a stable
choice of strategies for both players.
Before passing to examples of ergodic games, let us remark that, in real life,
Nash equilibrium is verified in many situations. For an example of Nash equi-
librium in usual games, suppose a certain set of companies share the market of
telephonic communications in a certain country. Each company has its prices for a
certain set of services all of them offer to the costumers. Suppose company A anal-
yse the market and conclude it can not get a better profit by changing its prices
(supposing the other companies keep their prices unchanged). Then company A
has no reason to modify its prices (its strategy). If all other companies are in the
same situation, then the Nash equilibrium is attained, and is stable in the sense
that no players will change their strategies unilaterally.
Now we consider two examples of ergodic games, in the case payoffs are given
by (1):
a) A2 = −A1. This is called a zero-sum game, where the gains of one player
are based on the losses of the other. In this particular case we can use a
minimax formulation to define the Nash equilibrium of the game. Zero sum
games are well-known examples of games, but are very restrictive. For this
reason, we will not consider the minimax formulation here.
b) A2 = A1. In this case, one could think we have here a simple problem of
ergodic optimization (see [2]), and indeed there is some relation with ergodic
optimization, in the sense that a choice (µ¯, ν¯) of strategies that maximizes
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the common payoff is a Nash equilibria: suppose (µ¯, ν¯) maximizes∫
X×Y
A1(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) =
∫
X×Y
A2(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) (4)
over the set of mutual strategiesMT (X)×MS(Y ) (which is a product space).
Then, as a direct consequence of definition 1, (µ¯, ν¯) is a Nash equilibrium for
the ergodic game. However, as we just consider here product measures, this
is not an ergodic optimization problem in the usual sense. Another feature of
non-cooperative games which shows that the searching for Nash equilibrium
in the case A1 = A2 can not be reduced to solving an ergodic optimization
problem is the fact that, as there is no communication among players, they
can not decide to use a common strategy.
3 Ergodic optimization and games
In this section, we suppose payoffs are given by (1). Although stated for the case
of two players, the following results can be easily generalized to any finite number
of players.
Theorem 1. Suppose the payoffs are given by (1), where the potentials are Lipschitz-
continuous functions. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is an application of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg
Theorem (see [1]). We begin with some preliminary results that allow us to in-
troduce this set-valued fixed point theorem. Remember that, if M is a set, P(M)
denotes the set of subsets of M .
Definition 2. Let M be a set. A set-valued function on M is a function ξ :M →
P(M) such that ξ(x) 6= ∅ for all x ∈M .
Definition 3. Let E be a Hausdorff topological vector space, K a non-empty com-
pact and convex subset of E, and ξ : K → P(K) a set valued function on K. Then
ξ is a Kakutani map if:
a) ∀x ∈ K, ξ(x) is a closed and convex non-empty subset of P(K).
b) the set
Gr(ξ) = {(x, y) | x ∈ K, y ∈ ξ(x)}
is closed in the product topology of K × K. This means that if (xn, yn) →
(x, y) and yn ∈ ξ(xn) then y ∈ ξ(x).
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Theorem 2 (Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg). Let K be a non-empty compact and con-
vex subset of a convex Hausdorff topological vector space. Let ξ : K → P(K) be a
Kakutani map. Then there exist a point x∗ ∈ K such that
x∗ ∈ ξ(x∗).
Before we are able to prove our first existence result, we need to prove a tech-
nical lemma. First remember the Wasserstein-1 metric over M(X), given by
W 1(µ1, µ2) = sup
Lip(ϕ)≤1
∫
ϕd(µ1 − µ2), (5)
where
Lip(ϕ) = sup
x 6=x′
|ϕ(x)− ϕ(x′)|
dX(x, x′)
is the Lipschitz norm on the set of Lipschitz functions from X to R. This form of
the Wasserstein-1 metric is a well-known consequence of Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality theorem (see [13]). As we are in compact spaces, we know W 1 metrizes
the weak-* topology. We also have that, for any Lipschitz map ψ : X → R,∫
ψd(µ1 − µ2) ≤ Lip(ψ)W
1(µ1, µ2). (6)
Lemma 3. Suppose νn and µˆn are sequences of probabilities on Y and X, respec-
tively, and that νn → ν and µˆn → µˆ. Then, if A1 is Lipschitz-continuous, we
have ∫
A1(x, y)dµˆn(x)dνn(y)→
∫
A1(x, y)dµˆ(x)dν(y) .
Proof of lemma 3: We use Fubini Theorem:∣∣∣∣
∫
A1(x, y)dµˆn(x)dνn(y)−
∫
A1(x, y)dµˆ(x)dν(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ ∫
A1(x, y)dνn(y)dµˆn(x)−
∫ ∫
A1(x, y)dν(y)dµˆn(x)
∣∣∣∣+
+
∣∣∣∣
∫ ∫
A1(x, y)dν(y)dµˆn(x)−
∫ ∫
A1(x, y)dν(y)dµˆ(x)
∣∣∣∣ .
Now, compactness implies that x 7→
∫
A1(x, y)dν(y) is a continuous function,
and this means that the second term above converges to zero when n→ ∞. The
first term also goes to zero because it is bounded by∫ ∣∣∣∣
∫
A1(x, y)dνn(y)−
∫
A1(x, y)dν(y)
∣∣∣∣dµˆn(x),
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and using (6) we have, ∀x,∣∣∣∣
∫
A1(x, y)dνn(y)−
∫
A1(x, y)dν(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Lip(A1)W 1(νn, ν).

Proof of theorem 1: Let K =MT (X)×MS(Y ). Using lemma 1, we know that
K is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of the Hausdorff topological vector
space given by the product of the spaces of finite signed measures on X and Y .
Now let ξ = BR : K → P(K) be the set-valued function given by:
BR(µ, ν) = BR1(ν)× BR2(µ).
Claim: BR is a Kakutani map (see definition 3).
Proof of the Claim: We begin by noting that the condition (a) of definition 3
is a direct consequence of lemma 2.
Now we address condition (b) of definition 3. Suppose
(
(µ, ν), (µˆ, νˆ)
)
belongs
to the closure of Gr(BR) ⊂ K ×K. We need to prove that (µˆ, νˆ) ∈ BR(µ, ν). To
do that, we know K =MT (X)×MS(Y ) is metrizable and so is K×K. Therefore,
there exists a sequence
(
(µn, νn), (µˆn, νˆn)
)
converging to
(
(µ, ν), (µˆ, νˆ)
)
, such that
(µˆn, νˆn) ∈ BR(µn, νn). Now µˆn ∈ BR1(νn) for all n ∈ N. This means that for any
other strategy µ˜ for player 1, we have
ϕ1(µˆn, νn) ≥ ϕ1(µ˜, νn),
which means ∫
A1(x, y)dµˆn(x)dνn(y) ≥
∫
A1(x, y)dµ˜(x)dνn(y).
If we take the limit when n→∞, using lemma 3, we get∫
A1(x, y)dµˆ(x)dν(y) ≥
∫
A1(x, y)dµ˜(x)dν(y) ∀ µ˜ ∈MT (X),
which means that ϕ1(µˆ, ν) ≥ ϕ1(µ˜, ν) ∀ µ˜ ∈ MT (X), and this implies µˆ ∈ BR1(ν).
In an analogous way we can prove that νˆ ∈ BR2(µ), and these two facts imply
that (µˆ, νˆ) ∈ BR(µ, ν). This ends the proof of the Claim.
Now Kakutani Fixed Point (theorem 2) implies the existence of (µ¯, ν¯) satisfying
(µ¯, ν¯) ∈ BR(µ¯, ν¯) . Therefore, {
µ¯ ∈ BR1(ν¯),
ν¯ ∈ BR2(µ¯),
and this means that (µ¯, ν¯) is a Nash equilibrium point. 
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4 Thermodynamic formalism and games
In this section, we suppose the payoffs are given by (2), i.e.{
ϕ1(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A1(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(µ),
ϕ2(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
A2(x, y)dµ(x)dν(y) + h(ν),
where h(µ) and h(ν) are the metric entropy of the measures µ and ν. We also
suppose the potentials A1 and A2 are Lipschitz maps and satisfy the condition
|Ai(x, y)− Ai(x
′, y)− Ai(x, y
′) + Ai(x
′, y′)| < CdX(x, x
′)dY (y, y
′) ∀ i = 1, 2, (7)
where C > 0. Condition (7) holds, for example, if X = Y = [0, 1] and A1 and A2
are C2 maps.
Finally, we suppose X and Y are both given by the Bernoulli space of sequences
in d symbols, i.e.
X = Y = B ≡ {1, 2, 3 . . . , d}N,
with the usual metric (see [11]) and the maps T and S are given by the shift map
on B.
Remark: As an alternative to this hypothesis, we could require the maps T and
S to be expanding continuous maps of the circle, or more generally, topologically
mixing expanding continuous maps on compact metric sets. All the results of this
section hold under any one of these other hypothesis. In fact all we need is to
be able to define the Ruelle operator and equilibrium measures, and also have
uniqueness of equilibrium measures (see lemma 6, and references [3, 11]).
The main result of this section is
Theorem 3. Let T and S be the shift map on the Bernoulli space of d symbols.
Suppose the potentials A1 and A2 are Lipschitz, and satisfy (7). Then there exist
a Nash equilibrium point for the game where payoffs are given by (2).
We begin with some technical lemmas.
Remember that M(X) and M(Y ) are metric spaces with the Wasserstein-1
metric (5) and that the topology generated by this metric is equivalent to the
weak-* topology. Let us also denote by L(X,R) the set of Lipschitz maps from X
to R. We define in L(X,R) the norm ‖ · ‖ : L(X,R)→ R given by
‖ψ‖ = ‖ψ‖0 + Lip(ψ),
where ‖ψ‖0 = supx∈X |ψ(x)| is the usual C
0 norm and Lip(ψ) = supx 6=x′
|ψ(x)−ψ(x′)|
dX(x,x′)
is the Lipschitz norm. It is a well-known fact that ‖ψ‖ is a norm that makes
L(X,R) a Banach space (see [11]). In an analogous way, we define L(Y,R) and its
norm.
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Lemma 4. Suppose A1 : X × Y → R is Lipschitz and also satisfies condition (7).
For any ν ∈M(Y ), the function ψν : X → R given by
ψν(x) =
∫
Y
A1(x, y)dν(y) (8)
is Lipschitz. Also, the map that sends ν ∈MS(Y ) to ψν ∈ L(X,R), given by (8),
is a Lipschitz continuous map: we have
‖ψν − ψν′‖ ≤ (C + Lip(A1))W
1(ν, ν ′). (9)
Proof of lemma 4: The map (8) is clearly Lipschitz. In order to prove (9),
we claim that for any pair of points x and x′ in X , the function ξx,x′ : Y → R
given by
ξx,x′(y) = A1(x, y)− A1(x
′, y)
is Lipschitz and Lip(ξx,x′) = CdX(x, x
′).
This claim is a direct consequence of the hypothesis (7): for any y and y′, we
have
|ξx,x′(y)− ξx,x′(y
′)| = |A1(x, y)− A1(x
′, y)− A1(x, y
′) + A1(x
′, y′)|
< CdX(x, x
′)dY (y, y
′).
Now we prove (9): we begin by considering the C0 norm: note that
|ψν(x)− ψν′(x)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
Y
A1(x, y)dν(y)−
∫
Y
A1(x, y)dν
′(y)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
Y
A1(x, y)d(ν − ν
′)(y)
∣∣∣∣
≤ Lip(A1)W
1(ν, ν ′),
where we used (6). This proves that
‖ψν − ψν′‖0 = sup
x∈X
|ψν(x)− ψν′(x)| ≤ Lip(A1)W
1(ν, ν ′).
To deal with the Lipschitz norm, we note that
|(ψν − ψν′)(x)− (ψν − ψν′)(x
′)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Y
(A1(x, y)− A1(x
′, y))d(ν − ν ′)(y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Lip(ξx,x′)W
1(ν, ν ′) ≤ CdX(x, x
′)W 1(ν, ν ′),
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where we used (6) again, and the claim. This implies that
Lip(ψν − ψν′) = sup
x 6=x′
‖(ψν − ψν′)(x)− (ψν − ψν′)(x
′)‖
dX(x, x′)
≤ CW 1(ν, ν ′),
which finishes the proof of the lemma. 
The next lemma is analogous to lemma 4:
Lemma 5. Suppose A2 : X × Y → R is Lipschitz and satisfies condition (7).
For any µ ∈M(X), the function ψµ : Y → R given by
ψµ(y) =
∫
X
A2(x, y)dµ(x) (10)
is Lipschitz. Also, the map that sends µ ∈MT (X) to ψµ ∈ L(Y,R), given by (10),
is a Lipschitz continuous map: we have
‖ψµ − ψµ′‖ ≤ (C + Lip(A2))W
1(µ, µ′). (11)
Before passing to the last lemma, we need to recall some facts about equilibrium
measures and the Ruelle-Perron-Frobenius operator (see [3, 10, 11]).
The Ruelle-Perron-Frobenius operator associated to a Lipschitz potential A :
X → R is the operator on L(X,R) that associates to any ϕ ∈ L(X,R) the function
LA(ϕ) ∈ L(X,R) given by
LA(ϕ)(x) =
∑
T (z)=x
eA(z)ϕ(z).
Remember that if T is the shift map on the Bernoulli space of symbols, or if it
is an expanding continuous map of the circle, then it has finite degree, i.e. the set
{z ∈ S1‖T (z) = x} is finite and has the same number of elements for any x (this
result also holds when T : X → X is topologically mixing expanding continuous
map on a compact metric space X . See, for instance, [3, 10].)
A function A ∈ L(X,R) is called a normalized potential if LA(1) = 1. The
RPF operator has a maximal eigenvalue λA > 0 associated to an eigenfunction
ϕA, which is simple and positive (simple means the eigenspace has dimension 1).
If A is non-normalized then it can be normalized by considering
A¯ = A + logϕA − logϕA ◦ T − log λA.
The dual RPF operator, denoted by L∗A, acts on probability measures on X ,
and is defined by ∫
ψdL∗A(µ) =
∫
LA(ψ)dµ.
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If A¯ is the normalized potential associated to A, the dual operator L∗
A¯
has a
unique fixed probability µA (i.e. a probability µA that satisfies L
∗
A¯
(µA) = µA),
called the Gibbs state associated to A, which is invariant for T (and is also exact
and ergodic), and satisfies∫
Adµ+ h(µ) ≤
∫
AdµA + h(µA) , ∀ µ ∈MT (X).
Moreover, µA is the unique invariant measure to attain the maximum above. A
measure that attains the maximum above is called the equilibrium measure for A,
is unique, exact and ergodic and is the Gibbs measure µA. The last result is also
known as the variational principle for pressure (see also [3] chapter 20.3 or [10]).
A final and very important fact about equilibrium measures (see [7] and also
[4, 12] for more recent results on more general settings) is the fact that the func-
tion that associates to A ∈ L(X,R) the equilibrium measure µA ∈ MT (X) is a
continuous map (in fact, such function is even analytic - but here we will only need
its continuity).
Now, we are able to prove the next lemma:
Lemma 6. Let T and S be the shift map on the Bernoulli space of d symbols, and
suppose that A1 and A2 are Lipschitz continuous maps that satisfy (7). Then:
a) BR1(ν) and BR2(µ) both have only one measure (are singleton sets).
b) BR1 :MS(Y )→MT (X) is a continuous function (in the weak-* topology).
c) BR2 :MT (X)→MS(Y ) is a continuous function (in the weak-* topology).
Proof of lemma 6: (a) Let us fix ν ∈MS(Y ). We have
BR1(ν) = argmax
{
µ 7→
∫
X
(∫
Y
A1(x, y)dν(y)
)
dµ(x) + h(µ)
}
. (12)
Now, if we remember that
ψν(x) =
∫
Y
A1(x, y)dν(y),
using lemma 4, we have that ψν is a Lipschitz potential (defined on X) and any
measure on BR1(ν) is an equilibrium measure for (T, ψν). If we use the uniqueness
of equilibrium measures, we get that BR1(ν) is a singleton set. Analogously, using
lemma 5 we prove that BR2(µ) has only one measure, which finishes the proof of
the first item of the lemma.
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(b) We just need to use lemma 4, that proves that the map ν ∈MS(Y ) 7→ ψν ∈
L(X,R) is a Lipschitz map, and the fact that the equilibrium measure depends
continuously on the potential ψν .
(c) It is analogous to (b), using lemma 5. 
Proof of theorem 3:
Define BR :MT (X)×MS(Y )→MT (X)×MS(Y ) as
BR(µ, ν) = BR1(ν)× BR2(µ).
As a consequence of lemma 6, this is a well defined map. Moreover, it is
continuous, because both functions BR1 and BR2 are continuous. Now we can
use Tychonoff-Schauder fixed point theorem to get a fixed point, which is a Nash
equilibrium. 
5 Uniqueness
Now, we make some considerations about uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. We
remark that, even if we have uniqueness for maps BR1 and BR2 (i.e. even if the
best response of player one, given any strategy of player two, is unique - and vice
versa) this does not imply uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. We can have more
than one Nash equilibrium point even in this case: it is possible that (µ¯, ν¯) and
(µ˜, ν˜) are two Nash equilibrium points, with a unique best response of both players
in both situations.
Let us analyse an example. Let X = Y = B be the Bernoulli space, now on
two symbols 0 and 1. An element of B is denoted by x, where x = (x1x2x3x4 . . .),
with xi ∈ {0, 1} for any i ≥ 1. We denote by 0¯ the element 0¯ = (0000 . . .) and 1¯
the element 1¯ = (1111 . . .). The Dirac measure δ0¯ in 0¯ is an invariant measure for
the shift, as well as the Dirac measure δ1¯ in 1¯.
Now let A1 and A2 be any two Lipschitz maps such that

A1(0¯, 0¯) = 2,
A1(x, 0¯) < 2 if x 6= 0¯,
A2(0¯, 0¯) = 3,
A2(0¯, y) < 3 if y 6= 0¯,
and 

A1(1¯, 1¯) = 3,
A1(x, 1¯) < 3 if x 6= 1¯,
A2(1¯, 1¯) = 2,
A2(1¯, y) < 2 if y 6= 1¯.
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Suppose the payoff functions are given by (1). We see that the two pairs δ0¯ × δ0¯
and δ1¯ × δ1¯ are Nash equilibrium, and also that both maps BR1 and BR2 are
single-valued in both pairs, i.e, best response of both players is unique in both
situations: 

BR1(δ0¯) = δ0¯,
BR1(δ1¯) = δ1¯,
BR2(δ0¯) = δ0¯,
BR2(δ1¯) = δ1¯.
6 Ergodic Transport and a cooperative game
This section is independent of the results of the preceding sections. Here, we will
introduce a cooperative game. We will use tools from ergodic transport (see [5]).
As we said in the introduction, we will not elaborate on this example. We just
present it and plan to analyse it further in a future work.
Suppose the payoffs ϕ1 : X × Y → R and ϕ2 : X × Y → R are given by (1).
Suppose, however, that player´s 1 payoff does not depend on the strategy of player
2. This holds when A1(x, y) = A1(x) is a function of the first variable only. In this
case player 1 chooses his optimal strategy by solving a simple ergodic optimization
problem: Let µ be an invariant measure that maximizes
m ∈MT (X)→
∫
X
A1(x)dm(x).
Now we consider player 2. Suppose A2(x, y) does depend on both variables,
which means player 2 depends on player’s 1 choices. On his side, player 1 accept to
collaborate with player 2 and both search for a common strategy pi ∈MT,S(X×Y )
(which denotes the set of plans whose x-projection is T−invariant and y-projection
is S−invariant) provided his expected payoff
∫
A1dµ does not gets smaller. This
means that pi has to have x-projection given by µ. In other words, pi needs to
belong to ∈ Mµ,S(X × Y ), which is the set of plans whose x-projection is µ and
y-projection is invariant for S (see [5]).
So what they need to do is to solve an ergodic transport problem: they search
for the common strategy pi∗ that maximizes
pi ∈Mµ,S(X × Y )→
∫
X×Y
A2(x, y)dpi(x, y).
Here, we have a cooperative game because the common strategy is not a product
measure as in the preceding sections.
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Ergodic transport was introduced recently, see for example [5, 6] and among
other applications, we can find the invariant measure that minimizes theWasserstein-
2 distance (see [13]) from a given measure which is not invariant: we just have to
use as A2 the cost function given by the square of the distance, and search for the
measure that minimizes (instead of maximize) the expression above. In this case,
µ will play the role of any given measure, not necessarily invariant.
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